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Conceptual frameworks of accounting from
an information perspective
John Christensen*
Abstract — This paper analyses the benefits of accounting regulation and a conceptual framework using an information
economics approach that allows consideration of uncertainty, multiple agents, demand for information, and multiple
information sources. It also allows private information to enter the analysis. The analysis leads to a set of fundamental
properties of accounting information. It is argued that the set of qualitative characteristics typically contained in conceptual
frameworks does not adequately aggregate the information demands of users of accounting information. For example, the
IASB’s conceptual framework contains no guidelines for the trade-off between relevance and reliability. Furthermore,
neutrality might not be part of an optimal regulation. The statistical bias introduced by the stewardship use of accounting
information is not necessarily undesirable and will always remain; stewardship is the characteristic of accounting information
that provides incentives for management to act in the desired way. Accounting information is inherently late compared to
other information sources but influences and constrains the content of more timely sources. The accounting system does not
exist in a vacuum. Other information sources are present and the purpose of the accounting system cannot be analysed
without considering the existence of other information sources. Finally, financial statements are audited by an independent
auditor. This implies that accounting data are hard to manipulate.
Keywords: accounting regulation; conceptual framework; qualitative characteristics; information economics
1. Introduction
The question I have been asked to address is how
conceptual frameworks contribute to the quality of
corporate reporting regulation. This is by no means
an easy task. In the paper I shall attempt to show that
an answer requires identification of the concept of
quality of corporate reporting, of the purpose of the
conceptual framework, and of the benefits of
reporting regulation. In order to understand the
concept of the quality of corporate reporting it is
important to analyse the fundamental characteristics
of accounting information and its limitations.
The idea of the conceptual framework is to
provide a set of consistent principles to guide
regulation and reporting of financial information as
part of the political decision process. The IASB’s
current conceptual framework (IASC, 1989) gives
equal ranking to information that is useful to a wide
range of users in making economic decisions
(para. 12) and information that shows the results
of stewardship of management (para. 14). The
Discussion Paper that sought to bring together the
IASB and FASB conceptual frameworks (FASB/
IASB, 2006) asked whether stewardship had a
continuing role in the objective and indicated a
preference to focus solely on decision usefulness
(para. BC1.32 to BC1.41). In the proposed concep-
tual framework (FASB/IASB, 2008) the main
objective of decision usefulness is expanded to
include information about ‘management’s ability to
protect and enhance the capital providers’ invest-
ments’ (para. OB 9).
Previous work has shown that, in a single firm
setting, the accounting system has to be finely tuned
to the specifics of the organisation and its environ-
ment, including the economics of the firm, the
decision problems at hand, the private information
of the parties involved, the public information, and
the moral hazard problems of the organisation.
Furthermore, the world contains many firms and
many decision-makers.
It is impossible to construct an income measure
that reflects true income as defined by Hicks (1946)
when markets are not perfect and complete (Beaver
and Demski, 1979). Such a measure does not exist.
Rather, accounting should be viewed as an infor-
mation system as acknowledged by both FASB and
IASB in their original conceptual frameworks
(FASB, 1978; IASC, 1989). Unfortunately, there
is no universal ranking of information systems
(Christensen and Demski, 2003). In addition, it is
well known that no rational preference relation
describes the decision process of society (Arrow,
1951). The accounting system is the result of a
delicate balancing of the possibilities imbedded in
the accounting system and the demands of the users.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 14/6/2010 13 ABR Christensen.3d Page 287 of 300
*The author is Professor of Accounting at the Department of
Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark,
Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark. Tel: +45 6550
3244. E-mail: jcn@sam.sdu.dk.
He is grateful to the editor Pauline Weetman, an anonymous
referee, Paul Boyle, Robert Hodgkinson, Richard Macve,
Mogens Nielsen, Brian Singleton-Green, Alfred Wagenhofer,
and the participants at the 2009 Information for Better Markets
Conference for helpful comments.
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 40. No. 3 2010 International Accounting Policy Forum, pp. 287–299 287
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 22
:54
 05
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
This balancing is not entirely of a technical nature as
it calls for balancing of preferences of the parties
involved. Such balancing cannot be achieved by
technical rule-making and is inevitably the result of
a political decision process.
The accounting income number reports firm-
specific financial information to the market and thus
reduces the information asymmetry in the market.
The paper considers how information is simultan-
eously used by investors to make decisions and to
induce or influence management to behave opti-
mally or to use the entity’s resources efficiently. The
decision-influencing role distorts the reporting
incentives. Once the accounting information is
used for performance evaluation (or for decisions
regarding replacement of management), incentives
for earnings management arise (Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997; Graham et al., 2005). The reason is
that the financial statements include reporting of
private information by management as part of the
accruals. Auditing reduces this problem to some
extent. Managers often have an informational
advantage over the auditors and this prevents the
problem from being completely eliminated.
A current trend in financial reporting is toward
adoption of a fair value approach. It is highly
questionable whether this is a viable path. The firm
has an information advantage compared to the users
of financial information and this advantage is used
strategically in reporting. Fair value accounting
relies even more on the private information of
management, and enhances the possibilities for
earnings management and leaves auditing less
efficient. In addition, it is not obvious what
information should be included into the financial
statements. One question is whether the accounting
system or the users are better at performing the
aggregation of various information sources
(Christensen and Frimor, 2007).
A related question is how the accounting system
best complements other information sources. The
financial statements will always be published late
compared to other information sources. This is due
to the nature of financial statements as all transac-
tions must be processed and audited before the
statements are released. In contrast, management’s
forecast might be timely. The prime purpose of
financial statements might be to provide incentives
for reporting of other types of information.
The conceptual frameworks of both IASB and
FASB identify sets of the qualitative characteristics
of financial information. The origin of the qualita-
tive characteristics is related to the decision orien-
tation of accounting and was stated in the ASOBAT
report on accounting theory (AAA, 1966). These
qualitative characteristics certainly describe the
attribute for a useful information system when it is
used for decision-making purposes in a one-person
world. This might be very different in a multi-
person world. For example, one of the characteris-
tics calls for unbiased reporting standards, yet
recent research finds that the introduction of bias
might lead to welfare improvements (Christensen
and Demski, 2007). Furthermore, it is impossible to
maximise all qualitative characteristics simultan-
eously and consequently there is a demand for
trade-offs. However, the frameworks are silent on
how to do this. In a multi-person world it is not
possible to replace the individual preferences with a
set of qualitative characteristics.
It is obvious that there is a demand for regulation
of financial reporting and that a conceptual frame-
work includes the objective and basic principles of
reporting regulation. Given the multi-person nature
of the problem it might take the form of a
constitution (in the sense of fundamental laws and
principles). The benefit will be that the conceptual
framework forces the regulators to constantly seek
solutions that are maintaining and enhancing the
comparative advantage of the accounting system
compared to other information systems such as
press releases and web-based information sources.
An information economics framework allows
consideration of uncertainty, multiple agents,
demand for information, and multiple information
sources. It also allows asymmetry in the knowledge
of different stakeholders in the market such that the
firm knows something which is of value to the
market participants. Finally, it allows incentive
issues to be part of the analysis.
My analysis of how conceptual frameworks
contribute to the quality of corporate reporting
will fall into four parts. Section 2 will analyse the
supply of accounting information for decision and
control. Accounting accruals are seen as the primary
vehicle for management to report their private
information. The incentives for such reporting are
reviewed. Section 3 will deal with the demand for
financial information. It is argued that the demand
for decision purposes and control purposes leads
to different ranking of accounting systems. The
suggestion to have different accounting systems
for different purposes is analysed and rejected.
Section 4 will discuss the fundamental properties of
accounting information. The qualitative character-
istics and other fundamental properties will be part
of this discussion. Section 5 will show the impli-
cations of the analysis for the accounting regulation
and the conceptual framework. Conclusions are
offered in Section 6.
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2. The reporting organisation
2.1. Income measurement
One of the prime targets for accounting information
is the investor group and, according to common
wisdom, the main interest for this user group is the
future cash flows of the company. First assume that
the firm is placed in a perfect capital market under
certainty. The cash flow series for the lifetime of the
firm is given by:
CF ¼ ðCF0;CF1; :::;CFTÞ ð1Þ
Given perfect capital markets, a no arbitrage
argument leads to the well-known result that the
NPVof investing in a firm is zero. The value of the
firm at any given date t is given by:
PVt ¼
XT
j¼tþ1
CFjð1þ iÞtj ð2Þ
With this the income definition easily follows:
It ¼ CFt  ðPVt1  PVtÞ ð3Þ
This is economic income and coincides with the
classical income as defined by Hicks (1946) and it is
equal to cash flow minus economic depreciation.
Again, a no arbitrage argument leads to this income
being equal to the interest earned on the invested
capital or:
It ¼ iPVt1 ð4Þ
In a perfect world income measurement is not
interesting (Beaver and Demski, 1979). Everybody
knows everything and information adds nothing
new.
2.2. Decision information
Imperfection might take on many forms. The first to
be introduced here is adding some of the details
leading to the given cash flows. The firm is
producing one product and the basis for this is an
initial capital investment and labour in each period.
Both are acquired in perfect markets and the
production function describes a feasible relation-
ship between inputs and output. The demand is
exogenously given for each period. The realised
cash flows are the consequence of optimal produc-
tion during the lifetime of the firm. If inventories are
possible and if the production function exhibits
economics of scale or scope, production smoothing
will be part of the optimal production schedule.
Thus, the total assets of the firm will both contain
the inventory of finished products and the fixed
assets. Despite the fact that the value of the firm is
uniquely determined, it is not possible to find
individual values of the two assets that add up to the
total value of the firm. The non-separability of the
cost function combined with the non-perfect mar-
kets (for the finished product and the fixed assets)
leads to this result (Christensen and Demski, 2003).
The result points to the difficulty there is in defining
appropriate and descriptive accounting measures
even when faced with lots of regularity and
certainty. The analysis by Bromwich et al. (2009)
reinforces this point.
Now, no uncertainty leads to no demand for
information (or there is no such thing as information
in such a world). Formal introduction of uncertainty
into the model calls for a definition of the error
terms that have an influence on the cash flows in
each period. The simplest model of this type
includes the following stochastic cash flow series:
CF ¼ ðCF0 þ e0;CF1 þ e1; :::;CFT þ eTÞ ð5Þ
Assume that the εj’s are identically and independ-
ently distributed. The accounting system reports
routinely the realised cash flows, but the realised
cash flow from period j will have no predictive
ability with respect to future cash flows. Thus,
accounting information is only keeping track of the
realised cash flows, but it is hardly useful.
The introduction of a correlated error structure
changes this. Actions or decisions often have a
multi-period effect and this feeds into the stochastic
description of the future cash flows. Now observa-
tion/reporting of the cash flows will provide
information that enables the user to update the
expectation of the future cash flows. This estimation
uses the correlation structure. This is information
for valuation purposes as in Peasnell (1982). For the
purpose of facilitating this estimation the account-
ing system might be useful. This will be the case
when the accounting system, together with the
reporting of realised cash flows, provides more
insight into the error structure, thus enabling the
user to better form expectations about future cash
flows. More accounting variables might improve
the estimation. The key to finding valuable infor-
mation is to get information about the fundamental
time processes or the components which character-
ise the evolution of the cash flow series. Any bias in
the accounting variables does not matter as long as
the user is able to inverse the bias and decipher the
content of the accounts (Demski and Sappington,
1990). The important component remains the
unexpected error which is used to form expect-
ations. Any systematic bias in the accounting model
is easily countered through a balanced use of the
information.
Furthermore, the double entry accounting system
satisfying the clean surplus relations or the com-
prehensive income contains counterbalancing
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errors. Over the lifetime of the firm the accounting
income will always equal the total cash flows of the
firm. That is, whichever errors the present account-
ing valuation includes, these are balanced by the
error in the future expected accounting income
numbers (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995).
2.3. Control information
The control use of accounting numbers is often
modelled using the principal–agent model. The
principal hires an agent to perform a task for some
reason. The principal is unable to observe the action
selected by the agent and at the same time the act is a
source of disutility for the agent as he does not want
to work hard. The market for labour of the type of
the agent determines the level of the salary. The
agent has to be offered at least the utility he can get
from working elsewhere to accept working for the
principal. This is the classical moral hazard problem
(Holmstrom, 1979). The naïve interpretation of this
model is cast in the form of a simple working
relationship. However, it is descriptive of much
more complex relationships. Managerial action
choices are hardly observable in a classic sense. In
the managerial context the issue of goal congruence
is also predominant in the management accounting
texts (Horngren et al., 2003; Antle and Demski,
1988). The bottom line is the agent (manager) wants
to select a different action from the one desired by
the principal (owner). This is the basic moral hazard
problem.
In response to this problem the owner introduces
an incentive scheme to make the manager select the
desired action. The information supplied by the
accounting system becomes important here as the
payment is a function of the available accounting
information and the additional contractible infor-
mation signal. The owner’s outcome might or might
not be included in the accounting information. One
reason for this asymmetry is that the owner’s time
horizon might extend beyond the accounting and
other information available. This is in line with the
net present value focus of the stockholders.
From an accounting perspective it is interesting
that the information of value in this type of model is
information about the act taken. That is, whenever
an additional information source is available, it is
useful or of value if it provides more information
about the act selected (Holmstrom, 1979). The
interesting information in this context is informa-
tion that informs the parties about the source of the
market imperfection, in this case the non-observa-
bility of the act selected. The fundamental goal
conflict between the manager and the owner is
essential for this result. If that were not present, the
manager would simply choose the first best action.
Thus, the problem disappears when there is perfect
goal congruence in the organisation such that there
is no demand for incentive pay to promote the
actions desired by the owners. This includes the
tension between long-term and short-term profit
measures. Control problems are important to
accounting (Sunder, 1997).
The demand for information for control purposes
is closely tied to the act selection. Thus, it depends
upon the set of available actions how these differ in
terms of the manager’s preferences and in terms of
the owner’s preferences. One information system is
preferred to another information system if it is better
at providing incentives for the manager to select the
desired action. Intuitively it translates into how the
information systems are able to distinguish among
the available actions. When the focus is on the
accounting system it is also important to acknow-
ledge the presence of alternative information
sources. The value of a particular accounting system
depends upon which other information sources are
present. This is, however, only part of the story.
2.4. Reporting incentives
Managers are employed to make decisions. They
are also supposed to collect and process informa-
tion. And finally, they are employed to report
information, for example, through the accounting
system. Thus, part of the managerial job is to
acquire information and this information is, unless
disclosed, private to the manager. Some managers
are even hired because they possess special know-
ledge, which is also private information. In all cases
this adds to the imperfection of the relationship
between the owner and the manager. Consequently,
the contractual arrangements between the two
become more complex in response to this private
information. More interestingly, the timing of how
the events unfold becomes part of the problem.
If the private information gets into the hands of
the manager after the actions have been selected,
there is no immediate control problem. The contract
that controlled the actions of the manager without
considering the new information will continue to do
its job and induce the same action choice. However,
a new option arises as it might be possible to allow
the manager to communicate his private informa-
tion to the public and thus make the information
available for contracting purposes. Accounting
information is often of this type as accruals are
constructed at the end of a period.
Given the late arrival of this information it cannot
be used for selecting the action. The communicated
information can only be used for control purposes
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as the information might be used to induce the
efficient operation of the firm through incentive pay.
The communication of such private information is
constrained as the manager will only communicate
signals that are in the interest of the messenger.
Only the manager knows the specifics of the
information and the communication is impossible
to control directly. Thus there is yet another
possibility for gaming by the manager. One way
to resolve this is to make the owner offer a set of
contracts to the manager. The manager is then
supposed to choose among these. This is a revela-
tion game and through his choice the manager
reveals his private information. The use of the
information for contracting purposes is limited to
the use which is specified in the chosen contract.
What is more important is that the owner has to
commit to refraining from using the information
otherwise. The communication is controlled by the
other more primitive observable variables such as
cash flows and by the potential use of the informa-
tion for control purposes (Christensen, 1982). The
accruals are used for communicating the private
information of the managers, and reporting incen-
tives have to be taken into consideration. Other
information is used to control the reporting incen-
tives.
If the information is available to the manager
before the decision process is finished, the infor-
mation has the potential of informing and thus
directly influencing the decision. This might also be
the very purpose of hiring a manager in the first
place. There is then a potential for using the
information in the evaluation process as in the
previous case, but in addition to that there is also a
possibility for the manager to use the information in
the decision-making process. The double use of the
private information has an impact on the control
problem as that might be improved or made worse.
In extreme cases, the private information might be
of negative value to the firm. The information from
the manager can be extracted in the same way as
above but more complicated incentive issues have
to be taken into consideration (Christensen, 1981).
Communication of private information is pos-
sible both inside and outside the accounting system.
Communication within the accounting system is
limited to financial information. The initial record-
ing of a transaction takes place inside the account-
ing system. This information is then often combined
with themanager’s private information from outside
the accounting system to form accruals. The
accounting system handles this combination using
consistency as a controlling device. Depreciation is
a good example of how management’s expectation
is entered into the accounting system as an accrual.
The initial recording is historical cost and the
depreciation follows a predetermined plan accord-
ing to the expectations of management. During the
lifetime of the investment the managers might learn
more about the profitability of the investment. The
normal accounting treatment will not allow such
information to enter the accounting system. Only
hard evidence is accepted as an excuse for changing
the depreciation plan. Modern times call for fair
value to enter the accounting system. Fair value
accounting constitutes another example of account-
ing control and here it is historical cost combined
with market data that forms the accrual.
Management has private information concerning
the market value when considering firm-specific
assets. Market value is not always exogenously
given and users of financial statements have
concerns about the completeness of the market
search performed by management. The control
problem is easy to solve when there is a well-
functioning market for the asset in question. Then it
is routine to report a market-based value of the
asset. When the market is less well-functioning,
evidence has to be present to defend the accounting
treatment.
The communicationmight also take place outside
the accounting system and then the communication
is free of the rules, regulation, and conventions that
govern the accounting system. This information
channel is heavily used by modern corporations,
and security regulation is in place to regulate the
sharing of information among market participants.
The content of the communication is subject to
market control, and the published financial state-
ments are certainly part of the set of controls.
2.5. Auditing
Auditing is an important part of the controls that
allow private information to be communicated to
the decision-makers. The auditor might have two
functions: that of a quality control and that of an
independent actor who provides credibility to the
report (Kinney, 2000). Given the regulation which
surrounds the auditing profession, the latter task
must be very important. The first task could easily
be carried out by a person who is directly employed
by the firm. The latter task calls for independence
(Antle, 1984).
The auditor usually has a disadvantage compared
to the manager of the firm when it comes to
information about the firm. If reporting incentives
were trivial, the manager’s self-reporting of firm-
specific information would clearly dominate any
information that the auditor could provide. It is also
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noteworthy that the auditor only provides an
opinion of the published financial statements.
Thus, he is not producing the information himself
but only verifying the content. Given the problem-
atic reporting incentives of management, this func-
tion increases the information content of the
published statements (Christensen and Demski,
2003). A consequence of this finding is that it is
very important that the information contained in the
accounting system can be audited. In that way, audit
ability also becomes a constraint on the accounting
system.
3. Demand for information
3.1. The users of financial statements
The demand for accounting information, even for a
simple firm and only considering the owners (and
potential owners) and the manager, is quite com-
plicated. The present and potential owners have
investment decisions as well as control decisions.
The demand for information depends upon the
future cash flows, the control problem that is faced
by the organisation, the access of the two parties to
information, whether there is any private informa-
tion, and the possible observables to be used in
contracting. The usefulness of communicated pri-
vate information is very sensitive to all of these
factors. Consequently, even at the firm level, the
demand for information and the optimal choice of
accounting information system will be very specific
to the firm characteristics. The demand for infor-
mation is partly a response to the frictions in the
markets faced by the firm and the interrelationship
among the available sources of information, the
goal congruence of management, and the constitu-
ents of the firm and the incentives. A minor change
in one information source might have dramatic
consequences for the information content and the
use of accounting accruals. The reporting incentives
are hard to control. Thus there is no universally best
way to manage the reporting of the firm. The choice
must reflect a cost benefit comparison in order to
reach an optimal system (Christensen and Demski,
2003).
The information content of the accounting sys-
tem is mainly firm-specific information providing
the investors with input for their investment deci-
sions. Most of the information contained in the
accounting system is endogenous to the firm but
some pieces of information are the consequence of
the mixing of endogenous and exogenous informa-
tion. The prime example of this is fair value
valuation, which includes market information.
Modern finance has taught us that a rational, risk-
averse investor invests in a diversified portfolio of
assets. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
has informed us that the main ingredient in the
pricing of a security is the association of the security
and the market portfolio such that the correlation
between the security and the market portfolio, i.e.
the beta, accounts for the pricing of the security
(Beaver, 1998). The investor will demand a risk
premium for the market risk that is associated with
investing in a specific security. The firm-specific
risk will be diversified and the result is that this part
of the firm-specific risk disappears from the equa-
tion. The investor may also want information about
firm-specific risk in order to diversify, particularly if
he has non-diversifiable endowments (e.g. property
investments or skills). Consequently, the investor’s
demand for information concerns the risk and the
correlation of the firm return and the market return.
This is not the type of information which is given
the highest priority in the accounting system.
On the supply side, the accounting system
contains financial information about the activities
of the firm. The data are initially collected within the
firm as transactions. Later, revaluations and
accounting accruals are added to the system. As a
result, some data are hard data in the form of
realised cash flows, and other data are of a softer
nature as the accruals are based upon the expect-
ations of management, perhaps inspired by exo-
genous events like price changes. A general
characteristic of the accounting information is the
stamp which is provided by the auditor of the firm.
The accounting system has the comparative advan-
tage that it produces firm-specific information
primarily about the firm’s financial position.
Thus the accounting information is not in
demand by the general investor who follows the
advice to invest in well diversified portfolios.
Rather, accounting information is useful for persons
who are placed (for some reason) in a speculative
position. Some investors look for information about
future cash flows to identify when it is optimal to
exchange the investment for cash. Another group of
investors look for stewardship information to
induce efficient operation of the firm. There is not
a generally best accounting system across firms
(Christensen and Demski, 2003). The optimal
information system is unique to each relationship,
and the accounting system has to compromise
among the users and producers. A choice also has to
reflect the preferences of the stakeholders of the
firms and it has to balance the possible uses of the
accounting system. Furthermore, as Arrow’s the-
orem suggests the non-existence of a social welfare
choice function, the choice must be the result of a
political decision process (Arrow, 1951, and
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Demski, 1973). The exposure draft, (FASB/IASB,
2008), acknowledges this dilemma more specific-
ally than the extant IASB and FASB conceptual
frameworks, as it identifies the capital providers as
the primary users (para. OB5 to OB8). Capital
providers’ demand for information includes both
the ability to generate future cash flow and the
ability to protect and enhance the investments. The
focus on reporting incentives could be stronger.
This is further mixed with a public goods
problem in the sense that once the information is
produced and the cost for that is incurred, the
information is a free good. Consequently, if left
alone, the market would end up with an under-
supply of accounting information. This creates a
lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970) in the market for
the assets of the firm and there is a demand for
regulation of the supply of firm-specific informa-
tion. If the signalling behaviour is important the
result might be an oversupply of information.
3.2. Multiple uses of financial information
According to the discussion of the reporting firm,
accounting serves two purposes: decision and
control. Information for decision purposes is infor-
mation that enables the decision-maker (an
investor) to estimate the future cash flows for
investment decisions. This means information that
feeds into the net present value calculation.
Different signals lead to different decisions.
Information for control purposes informs the deci-
sion-maker about the ‘act’ selected by the manager
of the firm. Here the important characteristic is the
ability of the information to provide information
that enables the owner to distinguish the desirable
from the undesirable action. The purpose of this is
then to allow the owner to provide incentives for
selection of the desirable action. The two purposes
are not identical and the rankings of information
systems according to these two purposes do not
necessarily coincide. This means that when faced
with a choice among a set of information systems,
one information system might be preferred for one
purpose and another might be preferred for the other
purpose. This implies that there is not one univer-
sally optimal accounting system independent of the
use of the information (Gjesdal, 1981; Christensen
and Demski, 2003).
One way to proceed is to consider several
accounting systems – one for each purpose or user
group. Generically that could be one for control
purposes and one for decision purposes serving the
stockholders of the firm. In this way, the accounting
system could overcome the incentive issues raised
previously as management will only communicate
information which is in its own best interest for
control purposes. Separating the two sets of reports
will remove this conflict. Unfortunately this is not a
viable option. Management will only communicate
everything if the users are able to and will commit
not to use the information too aggressively. Given
the separation of management and stockholders, it
is hardly possible for the owners to commit to such a
policy. Bad news in the decision information
domain will at some point spill over to bad news
in the control domain and thus the incentives for
complete and truthful communication in the deci-
sion domain break down. Therefore, we cannot
expect that a separation of the user groups and their
reports will lead to an accounting system for
decision-making which is free from the bias intro-
duced by the incentives of management.
4. The properties of accounting information
4.1. The qualitative characteristics of financial
statements
The qualitative characteristics of the conceptual
framework are the attributes which make the
information useful to users according to the
conceptual frameworks of the IASB (IASC, 1989)
and FASB (FASB, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985). This
is the important link between the information source
and the users. The qualitative characteristics then
function as a proxy for the users. The details of the
decision problem are replaced by the qualitative
characteristics. As noted earlier, the origin of the
qualitative characteristics is related to the decision
orientation of accounting and was stated in the
ASOBAT report (AAA, 1966). These qualitative
characteristics certainly describe the attribute for a
useful information system when it is used for
decision-making purposes in a one-person world.
The inherent multi-person nature of most account-
ing issues is ignored. The question to be analysed
here is whether the qualitative characteristics can
replace the users when the regulators are deciding
upon accounting standards.
Focus first on the pair ‘relevance’ and ‘reliability’
as these attributes have hitherto been identified as
the most important ones (although ‘reliability’ is
replaced by ‘faithful representation’ in FASB/IASB,
2008). The IASB conceptual framework (IASC,
1989: para. 45) calls for a balancing between
qualitative characteristics but offers little assistance
beyond a reference to ‘professional judgement’. In
the wording of the Exposure Draft (FASB/IASB,
2008), ‘Enhancing qualitative characteristics
improve the usefulness of financial information
and should be maximised to the extent possible’
(para. QC 25). In order to analyse this balance,
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briefly consider the model of Feltham and Xie
(1994). They consider a multi-task agency model.
The manager faces a two-dimensional task and is
supposed to select an action pair a = (a1, a2). The
owner wants to maximise expected profitΠ = b1a1 +
b2a2. The accountant has to choose between two
different information systems. The first will report a
profit of p1 = b1a1 + b2a2 + ε1 and the second will
report a different profit of p2 = c1a1 + c2a2. The first
information system weighs the two actions accord-
ing to the objective function of the firm but has
noise as well. The second has no noise but gives a
biased profit compared to the objective of the firm.
Thus the first information system scores high on
relevance and low on reliability. The second is very
reliable but less relevant. Using the two information
systems for contracting purposes illustrates the
consequences of a second best world. Using the first
profit measure leads to a deficiency. Providing
incentives to work imposes a non-trivial risk upon
the manager and consequently he requires a risk
premium in his pay for performance contract. The
second information system leads to a decision from
the manager which is not aligned with the first best
choice as the mix of the two actions is skewed. This
is also inefficient. Consequently, there will be
different costs associated with the two information
systems. The first will include a risk premium and
the second will reflect the unbalanced weighted
decision. Now perform a comparative static analy-
sis. If b is small (compared to ε1) the second
information system will be optimal. If b is large
(compared to ε1) the first information system will be
optimal. The information systems including the
relevance or reliability characteristics are not
changed,1 yet the optimal information system
changes as a consequence of the difference in the
underlying decision problem. The optimal choice is
not accurately described by the pair relevance and
reliability. Wagenhofer (2009) makes a similar
point.
To take the analysis one step further, the concept
of faithful representation or neutrality is considered.
Faithful representation means that the transactions
and other events should be represented in the
financial statements in a way it purports to be. This
takes away any consideration of managerial incen-
tives to control the information system. Yet it is
widely acknowledged and documented that there is
a phenomenon called earnings management and
that this takes on many forms. This has been
documented in many and very different ways (Dye,
2002; Nelson et al., 2002; Demski, 1998). The next
level of earnings management has led to the
emergence of something that might be labelled
designer transactions, which stands for transactions
that just satisfy a set of conditions to qualify for
being accounted for in a specific way. The Enron
case was a huge system of such designer transac-
tions. The point is that the focus on qualitative
characteristics skips over the finer details of the
decision problem and in this case over the reaction
of those making the reporting system once a
regulation is in place. They might design transac-
tions to circumvent the regulation. The regulators
must consider the incentives of the information
producers to maximise the result of the regulation
effort. Furthermore, this might lead to optimality of
non-neutral standards and non-neutral accounts as
suggested by Dye (2002) and Christensen and
Demski (2007).
The qualitative characteristics work as a way of
simplifying the decision problem faced by the
regulators as the finer details of the accounting
decision problem including preferences, decision
problems and information environment are simpli-
fied into only viewing the qualitative characteristics
of accounting information. This appears to be too
simplistic as it blinds the regulators to incentives
that are inherent in the system producing accounting
information and to the more delicate trade-offs that
the regulators (and information producers) are
facing.
4.2. The fundamental properties of financial
statements
In very general terms, the purpose of financial
statements is to provide information for the con-
stituents of the firm. This is a very broad purpose,
yet financial statements have some very fundamen-
tal properties which will remain no matter the
regulation. Some of these will be discussed in the
six points below. First, the optimal reporting for the
firm is unique to the specifics of the firm. Second,
the general purpose of accounting information is
usually cast in the wording of decision information
and stewardship information. The bias introduced
by the stewardship use of accounting information
will always remain. Third, the accounting informa-
tion specialises in firm-specific information, and
mainly investors holding a speculative position
benefit from financial reporting. Fourth, the
accounting information is inherently late compared
to other information sources. Fifth, the accounting
system does not exist in a vacuum. Other informa-
tion sources are present and the purpose of the
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accounting system cannot be analysed without
considering the existence of other information
sources. Sixth, the financial statements are audited
by an independent auditor. This implies that
accounting data are hard to manipulate.
Eventually a synthesis of these points will lead to
the identification of the role of the conceptual
framework.
Following the earlier discussion of the reporting
firm, the main content in financial statements is
financial information about the firm. This follows
from the historical development and it also reflects
the comparative advantage of financial reporting.
Furthermore, it was concluded that the optimal
information system, which balances cost and bene-
fits of the information system, is highly specific to
the details of the specific reporting situation. This
includes the decision problems faced, the informa-
tion present, and the distribution of this information
among involved parties. There is no universally
optimal information system independent of the
specifics of the reporting situation.
Furthermore, it is well established that the
rankings of information systems for decision pur-
poses and stewardship purposes are not aligned
(Gjesdal, 1981). As argued earlier, it follows from
the institutional setting that it is impossible to have
two different financial reporting systems – one for
stewardship purposes and one for decision pur-
poses. It is impossible for the users to commit to not
using the decision-relevant information for stew-
ardship purposes as the use of the information
system is decoupled from the production.
Consequently, the situation-specific optimal
accounting system will balance the pros and cons
of the information system for the different purposes.
This suggests that there is always a bias in the
accruals which is related to the stewardship use of
the information.
Another point is how the accounting system best
supplements the other, perhaps more timely, infor-
mation sources that are found in the information
society. The famous Ball and Brown (1968)
diagram suggests financial accounting indeed pro-
vides information which is used by the market
participants to value the securities in the market.
Unfortunately, the diagram also suggests that only a
small fraction (8% according to Lev, 1989) of the
total information released to the market stems from
the published financial statements. The market
reacts to all kinds of information and this informa-
tion is clearly timelier than accounting information.
Yet most information sources are not regulated.
Accounting information is heavily regulated and
has an important effect on other information
sources. The financial report has a potential for
controlling the information content in other perhaps
more timely information sources.
The conceptual framework implicitly assumes
that financial statements should carry all relevant
information and thus it disregards the existence of
other information sources. This view does not allow
for a specialisation of the different types of
information sources. The accounting system con-
structed in one way might be a better supplement to
existing information sources than another account-
ing system that is supposed to stand on its own. The
big question remains as to who is best able to
aggregate the financial information with other
sources of information which are available to the
market participant. It appears to be too naïve to
assume or conclude that this aggregation is best
performed by the accountants. The famous Roll
(1984) paper suggests that this should be taken
seriously. Who would, at the outset, have expected
the financial markets to outperform a set of
meteorologists when it comes to forecasting wea-
ther in a small region of Central Florida? The
market mechanism is an extremely strong informa-
tion aggregator and it might, despite the fact that
each of the market participants only has very noisy
information compared to the firm, be very efficient
at performing such an aggregation
The final observation is that financial statements
are unique in the sense that they are audited. That is,
the private information of the firm is verified by an
independent auditor before being entered into the
financial statements. Consequently, only informa-
tion that passes this filter is included (Kinney,
2000). This implies that financial statements are
hard to manipulate and produce hard information
that is useful in repairing inefficiencies in markets.
Where do these six observations lead? First of all,
financial statements are not particularly suited to
serve the diversified investor. Mainly to investors
holding speculative positions will the financial
statements be of value. Next, is the balancing of
information to be included in and excluded from the
financial statements? The first observation is that
this is an empirical question as it is highly
contingent upon the situation whether the account-
ant or the market is best at aggregating information.
Routinely, the accounting system steps away from
including investment in the future into the assets
because the benefits are uncertain both with regard
to timing and amount. The market has no problem
in including such information into the valuation of
securities. The second observation is that account-
ing information is inherently late by construction.
Events have to take place and the entry into the
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published statements has to be verified by an
auditor. Numerous sources of information step in
and fill the gap. This is evidenced by Ball and
Brown’s (1968) diagram and Beaver (1998).
This leads to the following question: why
regulate accounting information when most of the
information action is going on in the non-regulated
regime of other information sources? These sources
are perhaps regulated with respect to timing due to
securities regulation but not with respect to content.
One possible answer to that question is that the
regulated accounting information serves as the
information source which ‘controls’ the other
information sources. Then all free voluntary infor-
mation disclosures are at the time of financial
reporting compared to the published financial
statements. If they are consistent it is viewed as
good news, whereas inconsistency is regarded as
bad news. The information content of the voluntary
disclosure is a function of the control that is built
into the accounting system. The financial statements
serve an important role in controlling such infor-
mation.
5. Accounting regulation
5.1. The purpose of a conceptual framework
Before going into the specifics of the present and
proposed conceptual framework it might be useful
to consider the stated purpose and scope of the
conceptual framework. The purpose of the present
IASB conceptual framework is to assist the Board in
developing future accounting standards, to assist
the Board in promoting harmonisation of regula-
tions and accounting standards, to assist national
standard-setters, to assist auditors in formulating
opinions, and to assist users (IASC, 1989). The
FASB states a similar purpose (FASB, 1980b).
Thus, the purpose is twofold. One is to help the
standard-setter to develop future standards, and the
other is to help those producing and using the
financial statements. A framework could be
regarded as a constitution defining the general
principles for the development of accounting
standards in the regulatory domain and for the
information content of financial statements in the
users’ domain. To fulfil this purpose a framework
should be invariant over a long period and formu-
late the general rules which constitute the core of
financial reporting.
As already indicated, the IASB and the FASB are
jointly participating in a project that is intended to
lead to a new conceptual framework which unites
the two frameworks of the two institutions. This
work is in progress and many preliminary working
papers have been released for comment. In the
exposure draft of the joint Conceptual Framework
(FASB/IASB, 2008) the purpose is reformulated as
establishing concepts that underlie financial report-
ing. The framework is thought of as a coherent set of
concepts that flows from an objective. Many
questions are being asked and not many have an
immediate answer.
5.2. Coordination of the financial statements
The research activities of the universities serve the
implicit regulation of accounting. Most of the ideas
which form the basis for our thinking of accounting
issues stem from the research community. The
notable contribution of Paton and Littleton (1940)
on corporate accounting standards provides a deep
insight into the fundamental and problematic issues
of income measurement. Also the American
Accounting Association’s Committees on
Accounting Reporting have had some influence,
most notably the ASOBAT (AAA, 1966) report.
The research industry is not well coordinated.
Consequently, a set of definitions of the elements of
financial statements is part of the conceptual
framework. The elements are the assets, the liabil-
ities, the equity, the income, and the expenses. The
framework also provides definitions of recognition
rules related to the basic elements. Finally, the
general rules of accounting measurement are
included in the conceptual framework. Taken
together, the definition of elements of financial
statements is thought to govern the inclusion and
exclusion of information in the financial statements.
Analysing the demand for accounting informa-
tion for a specific entity leads to a specific optimal
information structure. The accounting system has to
be finely tuned to the specifics of the organisation
and its environment. The flexibility of the account-
ing system is a key to its success as an information
system. Within the general framework of accrual
accounting there is room for many variations. This
allows feeding the expectations of management into
the accounting information in a controlled way. Too
much regulation would destroy this flexibility and
leave the accounting system useless (Christensen
and Demski, 2003).
The optimal accounting information system will
fill the gap left between the private and public
information to induce optimal decision-making in
the most general sense. Provided there is a well-
defined social preference relationship this informa-
tion will possibly be unique except for the repre-
sentation or the scaling of the information system.
Sending a message from one individual to another
might take on many equivalent forms, e.g. using
different languages. The important function of
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financial statements as an information source is that
the users are able to invert the mapping that
produces the information in the first place such
that the user learns the primitive underlying state
realisation or event (set of events) (Antle and
Demski, 1989; Demski and Sappington, 1990).
As the world contains many firms and many
decision-makers, there is a demand for coordination
of the scaling or representation of the information.
This would serve the purpose of coordination
among different users of the information such that
the information might be understood by a broader
audience and not coded for a specific user. In the
framework this is equivalent to the set of definitions
and the set of elements which constitute the
financial statements. No doubt this demand for
coordination is real. The demand could be satisfied
in the financial statements as a description of the
applied accounting methods. The textbooks or
professors are other candidates for taking care of
this coordination. Given the anarchistic and innova-
tive nature of both, this is probably not a good place
to do the coordination. National regulation will not
do the job either, given the open society.
Consequently, this job is best served by the
international accounting regulation.
As noted previously, the current view is that
financial statements provide financial information
about the firm. The format of the information
system is defined as accrual accounting and
universally agreed upon. Pointing this out belongs
to a long-term valid conceptual framework. The
specific definitions of what constitutes the elements
of the subsection of the financial statements are
subject to change as part of an evolution and might
be better placed in the standards.
5.3. A conceptual framework
There is certainly a demand for accounting regula-
tion as a market failure can be observed in the
market for information supply. Those who possess
the information might have poor incentives to
disclose such information and the market is also
haunted by a lemons problem as suggested by
Akerlof (1970). The literature on the demand for
regulation of financial statements is vast and a
recent summary of the arguments is given by
Bushman and Landsman (2010).
Now to the initial question of how do conceptual
frameworks contribute to the quality of corporate
reporting regulation? The conceptual framework
can be viewed as the constitution (statement of
fundamental laws and principles) that keeps control
over the process of accounting regulation. A
constitution should have long-term validity and it
should not be changed in response to small changes
in the workings of society. This calls for a rather
robust wording of the conceptual framework.
However, this is not the way the present conceptual
framework is set up. It is far too detailed and might
consequently fail in its purpose, as observed by the
AAA committee on Financial Reporting (AAA,
2009). I share their view.
A conceptual framework should function as a
constitution to remind the regulators of the overall
goal of financial reporting such that the details of
individual standards are kept in line with that.
Therefore a conceptual framework should contain
that goal. As found earlier there is not unanimity
among stakeholders on this issue and it is part of a
political process. Thus it is impossible to define
what is meant by quality of corporate reporting
objectively and often we are reducing this question
to one of measuring the cost and benefits of
regulation as in Schipper (2010). The regulators
are supposed to balance the pros and cons of
introducing or revising a standard. The overall goal
is to find a socially optimal level of disclosure of
firm-specific financial information which leads to
well functioning capital markets and to efficient
firms. Rather than providing a set of qualitative
characteristics which does not guide the regulatory
process, as noted earlier, it would be more useful to
state the perceived comparative advantages and the
perceived limitations of financial statements.
One of the advantages of the accounting system
is that it is audited, which makes the information
hard to manipulate. This is important given the role
accounting plays in reporting otherwise undisclosed
information and in controlling other sources of
information. It might also flag that some pieces of
information are hard evidence, whereas other pieces
are softer, such as accruals. The latter are reported
by management but have an accounting stamp as
the procedure for producing them lends itself to
auditing. The usefulness of the pieces of accounting
information depends critically upon the hardness of
the data.
The limitations include the potential bias of
financial statements. The word bias can be inter-
preted in two ways. One meaning implies that the
statements do not represent the expected value of
the asset, i.e. the reported value is not equal to the
mean. It is admittedly a nice property that a
measurement is free from bias, but any deviation
from this norm does not constitute a major problem
as that is easily resolved once the source of the bias
is known. The troublesome part is the bias
introduced by an involved party. Identifying and
resolving this type of bias could point to the
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importance of the incentives of management for the
preparation and interpretation of financial state-
ments. This would put these incentives in a central
role when it comes to the development of new
standards and when it comes to interpreting the
financial statements of firms. Along these lines, the
AAA committee has developed a few ground rules
for a conceptual framework (AAA, 2009). The
future development of the standards might benefit
from allowing competition among standards and
allowing firms to decide which set of standards they
want to satisfy (Dye and Sunder, 2001).
6. Summary and conclusions
The conceptual framework has been with us for a
long time and the regulation of accounting even
longer. Much regulation has been a consequence of
observed business failures (Clikeman, 2009). The
globalisation of business has led to a call for
harmonisation of accounting standards around the
globe and as a result the FASB and IASB have
joined forces to make one set of accounting
standards. One of their joint projects is a common
conceptual framework (FASB/IASB, 2006, 2008).
Consequently, the present interest in the develop-
ment of a new framework is seen.
In this paper I have reviewed the demand for a
conceptual framework from an information eco-
nomics perspective. This has been a broad analysis.
The point of departure was supposed to be the
consequences for the quality of financial reporting
of a conceptual framework. This is a very difficult
question as the notion of quality is very hard to
describe in the first place and secondly because the
roles of allocation between a conceptual frame-
work, the actual accounting regulation, and the
information content in financial statements are not
predetermined. Therefore, I have taken the path of
analysing the role and content of a conceptual
framework as a set of ground rules that is useful in
the regulation of financial reporting.
The focal point of a conceptual framework must
be the comparative advantage of accounting.
Accounting is an information source which is
always produced late in a decision process. That
stems from the fact that a main characteristic of
accounting information is that accounting data: (1)
are based upon the financial relationship of the firm
with outside parties and upon formal recognition
rules; (2) are subject to auditing; (3) acknowledge
the role of other, perhaps more timely, information
sources; (4) aggregate and allocate information over
time and units; and (5) are hard to manipulate. It is
an important role for the conceptual framework to
help the accounting system in maintaining the
comparative advantage.
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